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Priority-Aware Private Matching Schemes for
Proximity-Based Mobile Social Networks
Ben Niu, Tanran Zhang, Xiaoyan Zhu, Hui Li and Zongqing Lu
Abstract—The rapid developments of mobile devices and online social networks have resulted in increasing attention to Mobile Social
Networking (MSN). The explosive growth of mobile-connected and location-aware devices makes it possible and meaningful to do the
Proximity-based Mobile Social Networks (PMSNs). Users can discover and make new social interactions easily with physical-proximate
mobile users through WiFi/Bluetooth interfaces embedded in their smartphones. However, users enjoy these conveniences at the cost
of their growing privacy concerns. To address this problem, we propose a suit of priority-aware private matching schemes to privately
match the similarity with potential friends in the vicinity. Unlike most existing work, our proposed priority-aware matching scheme
(P-match) achieves the privacy goal by combining the commutative encryption function and the Tanimoto similarity coefficient which
considers both the number of common attributes between users as well as the corresponding priorities on each common attribute.
Further, based on the newly constructed similarity function which takes the ratio of attributes matched over all the input set into
consideration, we design an enhanced version to deal with some potential attacks such as unlimitedly inputting the attribute set on either
the initiator side or the responder side, etc. Finally, our proposed E-match avoids the heavy cryptographic operations and improves the
system performance significantly by employing a novel use of the Bloom filter. The security and communication/computation overhead
of our schemes are thoroughly analyzed and evaluated via detailed simulations and implementation.
Index Terms—Priority, Privacy, Private Matching, PMSNs
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
SOCIAL networking is one of the fastest-growing ac-tivities among mobile users domestically and world-
wide. According to eMarketer [1], they estimate the
number of US smartphone users will reach 192.4 millions
by 2016, and 2.28 billions worldwide. By smartphones
equipped with WiFi/Bluetooth modules, users can com-
municate with others easily and exchange information,
content and media on shared communities such as Face-
book or Foursquare. Among these services, an important
classification is Proximity-based Mobile Social Networks
(PMSNs), which deeply relies on mobile users’ physical
proximity. This kind of applications can provide us
more opportunities to discover and make new social
interactions within some public places, such as airports,
bars or other social spots. PMSNs thus gain increasing
attention in social networking.
Normally, to enjoy these activities, people always need
to reveal some information such as their attributes or
personal information to potential friends nearby as the
first step. A straightforward way is that, an initiator
broadcasts her attributes to nearby users directly, and the
responders decide whether to contact her based on com-
mon attributes. Obviously, the user’s privacy is revealed
during such process. Since some of these attributes may
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be sensitive or private to the user, it is harmful to
leak them to everyone nearby, especially the potential
malicious users.
To address this problem, many research solutions [2],
[3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [?] have been proposed.
Among these solutions, most of them employ third party
servers, and thus, they become the bottlenecks from both
security/privacy and system performance points of view.
Although this kind of third party servers can be set to
offline, the mobile users need to access them to register
identities and obtain the matching results, which bring
extra 3G/4G communication cost. Some researchers con-
sider this situation as a Private Set Intersection (PSI)
problem [10], [11], [12], [13] and try to achieve private
matching while avoiding the third party servers by
employing Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) [8]
and Paillier Cryptosystem [6], [9]. Unfortunately, the PSI-
based solutions can avoid the trusted server effectively
but always fail to improve the system performance due
to the heavy cryptographic operations.
Moreover, existing schemes do not always produce
accurate matching results. For example, [8] and [14]
measure the similarity between users by simply counting
the number of common attributes, and the matching
decisions is made by checking whether the proximity
measurement of two profiles is larger, equal, or smaller
than a pre-defined threshold value in [15]. However, in
reality, user interests may be associated with different
priorities. We illustrate our concerns with an example
in Fig. 1, the two-tuple represents user’s interests with
the corresponding priorities. The scenario is that Alice’s
father is suffering from cancer and she needs to go to
hospital everyday after work. In this situation, the most
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Fig. 1: Motivation
interested person she wants to know is someone who
is facing the same situation. Therefore, in the scenario
shown in Fig. 1a, the potential friend of Alice is Bob
instead of Charles, even though there are four common
attributes between Alice and Charles and only one with
Bob. However, this kind of schemes suffers the attack of
choosing the attributes as many as possible on the ad-
versary side, leading to the exposure of users’ personal
information. Although, the authors in [8] proposed a
solution by limiting the number of input attributes (e.g.,
200) to avoid this attack, it is hard to define a proper
number of input attributes for different users. To achieve
a fine-grained private matching, Zhang et al. [9] consider
the priority on each common attribute and define several
privacy levels in their work, but they only pay attention
on the difference of priorities on each common attribute
between users, and ignore the priority value itself. That
is to say, it works well for most cases except one shown
in the scenario of Fig. 1b. Alice has one common attribute
with either Bob or David, it makes sense that she prefers
to make friends with Bob since she pays more attention
on the attribute ”cancer”. However, the approach in [9]
cannot differentiate David and Bob from the Alice’s point
of view, since Alice and Bob have the common attribute
of ”cancer” at priority 10, and Alice and David have the
common attribute of ”music” at priority 3.
From the aforementioned analysis, it is clear that ex-
isting work either rely on third party servers, or employ
heavy cryptographic tools, or do not fully consider the
users’ privacy in terms of the priority assigned on each
attribute, or produce inaccurate matching results. In this
paper, we propose a set of priority-aware private match-
ing schemes to accelerate the widely used PMSNs. The
main contributions of this paper are shown as follows.
• We propose a set of schemes to achieve private
matching for different privacy goals. P-match achieves
the priority-aware private matching with considering
both the number of common attributes and the corre-
sponding priorities. In the enhanced version P-match+,
we construct a priority-aware Ochiai similarity coeffi-
cient to consider the ratio of attributes matched over all
the input set in our similarity function, which can ef-
fectively prevent several attacks, such as unlimitedly in-
putting users’ attribute sets. Finally, to make the private
matching process more efficiently, we propose E-match,
which improves the system performance by avoiding the
heavy commutative encryption function.
• We provide theoretic and experimental evidences
that our proposed matching schemes are secure and can
achieve our privacy goals. In addition, they are quite
efficient compared to many existing work in terms of
the computation cost, communication cost and energy
consumption.
• We implement the proposed schemes into smart-
phones. The experimental results indicate the effective-
ness and efficiency of our work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the related work. Section 3 presents the prelim-
inaries. Section 4 describes the designs of our proposed
schemes. Section 5 and 6 show the security analysis and
the evaluation results. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
There is a series of applications to provide private match-
ing between users in PMSNs. Most of these solutions
employ third party servers, which are always trusted
and acting as matching centers to serve users. Specif-
ically, each user sends her attributes to the server, the
server replies users with the matching result to indicate
the potential ”friends”. The servers need to know the
users’ personal information to perform the matching
process, it is thus much dangerous when the servers
are compromised. Social serendipity [2] provided mobile
users more opportunities to make social interactions
with potential friends nearby. However, it deeply relied
on a trusted server, which keeps all users’ profiles and
computes the similarity between users when needed.
The authors in [3] improved this problem by replac-
ing the trusted server with a service provider, such
as Facebook. However, users’ profiles are exchanged
in plaintext, which lead to serious privacy leakage.
SmokeScreen [16] introduced opaque identifier into the
information exchanging phase to protect user’s real iden-
tity. It employed a broker, which also acts as a trusted
server to provide matching results to users. As a result,
the broker known who is interested in solving whose
opaque identifier, which means the broker can infer the
relationship between users with high possibility. In their
follow-on work [4], they avoided this problem by not
disclosing the personal information for matching, and
using the location and time information as a replace-
ment. Unfortunately, this kind of servers are still bottle-
necks. The servers still need to know these information
3to perform the matching process. To avoid the third
party servers, many cryptographic tools-based solutions
have been proposed over recent years. Some researchers
conclude this situation into the Private Set Intersection
(PSI) or Authorized PSI (APSI) problem [10], [11], [12],
[13], which can effectively avoid the third party servers.
Based on PSI, Li et al. [8] proposed a set of privacy-
preserving profile matching schemes, where an initiating
user can find the best match with minimal information
leakage to others based on the security properties of
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC). However, the
expensive computation cost brought by the heavy cryp-
tographic operations decrease the system performance
significantly. In addition, their schemes may fail in reality
due to the ignorance on the priorities assigned on each
attributes. Zhang et al. presented a set of fine-grained
private matching schemes to achieve the requirements
of mobile users in reality. Under the protection of Pail-
lier Cryptosystem, their schemes achieved fine-grained
private matching with considering both the number of
common attributes and the assigned priorities. However,
they only paid attention on the differences of the prior-
ities.
Agrawal et al. [17] proposed a privacy-preserving
protocol by using the commutative encryption function,
which is more lightweight, to realize secret information
sharing between users. The keyed hash functions are also
employed to protect the sensitive attributes for mobile
users. Then, Vaidya et al. [18] extended the secret infor-
mation sharing phase into N-party setting, and Veneta
et al. [19] implemented this idea to detect friend-of-
friend in mobile social networks. However, since the
inherent weaknesses of the scheme in [17], such as un-
limitedly inputting behavior and lying behavior, simply
employing the commutative encryption function-based
solution cannot provide thorough security and privacy
properties. In this paper, we provide more properties by
combining commutative encryption function with other
techniques, such as similarity functions.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first state the problem and give the
adversary models. Then, we describe the design goals
and the cryptography tools in this paper.
3.1 Problem Statement
In PMSNs, each user holds a profile with two di-
mensional vectors, U = {〈u1, v1〉, 〈u2, v2〉, · · · , 〈um, vm〉},
where ui represents the user’s attribute and vi means
the priority value assigned to this particular attribute by
the user, such as vi = 1, . . . , 9. Normally, bigger value
indicates higher priority. Given a user and her profile U ,
the problem is how to find the best matched friend for
the user with privacy-preserving based on the criteria
that the best matched friend should have more common
attributes with the user, especially the same priorities on
the attributes.
3.2 Adversary Models
Since cryptography tools such as Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) can be easily implemented to protect current
communication systems, the attacks from outside adver-
saries, such as eavesdropping the wireless communica-
tion channels or modifying, replying and injecting the
captured messages can be easily prevented. Therefore,
in this paper, we assume the initiator is honest-but-
curious [10] or even an attacker directly. That means the
initiator will honestly follow the protocols, but tries to
learn more information than allowed in the honest-but-
curious model; or the initiator can directly be an attacker,
who may illegally input his attributes and the related
priorities, to learn more information of nearby users.
We also assume that the responder is legal or honest-
but-curious with two reasons: the identity of a responder
can be easily authorized by another authority entity, i.e.,
office in the hospital in the example mentioned in Sec.
1; another reason is that we can reverse our protocols to
achieve a dual matching. We further assume that neither
the initiator nor the responder can modify and obtain the
result of parameters in the running protocols.
3.3 Design Goals
Our main goal is to thwart the aforementioned threats
from either initiator or responder side. According to the
amount of information disclosed during the protocols
execution, we define two privacy levels from the initiator
Alice’s point of view, which can also be equivalently
defined from Bob’s viewpoint.
Definition 1 (Privacy Level I). When the protocol ends,
Bob learns the set of common attributes with Alice, as well
as priorities on these common attributes, and Alice learns the
similarity value.
In this case, the initiator believes that all the nearby
users are legal or honest-but-curious, and they can be
authorized by another entity. For instance, Alice may be
a new patient in the hospital ward. Her aim is to find a
best match.
Definition 2 (Privacy Level II). When the protocol ends,
Bob learns the number of common attributes and the simi-
larity value only when it exceeds the pre-defined threshold,
Alice learns the number of common attributes as well as the
similarity value.
This case indicates two threats from both sides. The
illegally input on the initiator side and curiously adjust
the threshold on the responder side.
3.4 Cryptography Tools
Existing private matching solutions always rely on Pri-
vate Set Intersection (PSI) [10], [12], [13] or Private
Cardinality of Set Intersection (PCSI) [20], which is
deeply based on heavy cryptographic operations such
as Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) [21]. To avoid
the heavy cryptographic operations, our protocols uti-
lize the commutative encryption function [17], which is
4more computational friendly and satisfies the condition:
Ek1(Ek2 (x)) = Ek2(Ek1(x)). Thus, a user who has the key
k1 or k2 learns x1 = x2 iff. Ek1 (Ek2(x1)) = Ek2(Ek1 (x2)),
but cannot learn any other xis of other user if xi is not a
common attribute. Since the priority for every attribute
is considered here, it is required that the encryption
function needs to be easily deciphered to compute the
similarity of two users. So we adopt the power function
fk(x) = x
k mod p as our encryption function for a safe
prime p, i.e. p and (p−1)/2 are both prime numbers. For
all integers k1, k2 and x ∈ Z∗p, ∃ an integer n, s.t.
fk1(fk2(x)) = fk1(x
k2 mod p)
= fk1(x
k2 − np)
= (xk2 − np)k1 mod p
= xk2k1 mod p, (1)
the last equality follows from the binomial theorem.
Similarly it holds fk2(fk1(x)) = x
k1k2 mod p. Therefore
fk1(fk2(x)) = fk2(fk1(x)). To obtain the decryption func-
tion, we need a corresponding number k′ to every k.
Choose k′ such that k′k = 1 mod φ(p), where φ(p) is
the Euler phi-function of p and φ(p) = p − 1 since p is
a prime. We use the Extended Euclidean Algorithm to
yield k′ and let gk(y) := y
k mod p for y ∈ Z∗p. Then
gk′(fk(x)) = gk′(x
k mod p)
= xk
′k mod p
= xnφ(p)+1 mod p
= x. (2)
The last equality holds because of the Euler Theorem. To
guarantee that x and y are both in Z∗p, we need a cryp-
tographic hash function hp(·) which has the quadratic
residues modulo p as its range.
4 THE PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, we present a suit of priority-aware private
matching schemes. The basic version, P-match, satisfies
Privacy Level I. As an improvement to achieve Privacy
Level II, we propose the enhanced version P-match+. Fi-
nally, the efficient version, E-match, improves the perfor-
mance significantly by avoiding the heavy cryptographic
tools such as commutative encryption function.
In our scenario, there may be several users in a par-
ticular area at a particular time period. Specifically, each
user holds a set of messages {〈xi, ai〉,KA, kA, xi ∈ X},
where X is a set of attributes, ai is the corresponding
priority of xi, KA and kA are two secret keys. Moreover,
all the procedures are mod p in our schemes. We use
the notations shown in Table 1.
4.1 Basic Version
4.1.1 Introducing the basic similarity function
Let Alice’s attribute set and corresponding priority vector
be X and A respectively, and Bob’s attribute set and
corresponding priority vector be Y and B respectively.
The set of common attributes between Alice and Bob
is denoted as S = X ∩ Y , where q = |S| and S =
{s1, s2, . . . , sq}. Then we arrange the corresponding pri-
orities of Alice and Bob on the common attributes into
TABLE 1: Notations
|A| Number of elements in the set A
R Public attribute pool for all users, n = |R|, R = {ri}
n
i=1
X Attribute set of Alice, n1 = |X|, X = {xi}
n1
i=1
, xi ∈ R
Y Attribute set of Bob, n2 = |Y |, Y = {yi}
n2
i=1
, yi ∈ R
S S = X ∩ Y , q = |S|
ai(bi) Priority of xi(yi), ai, bi = {1, 2, . . . , 10}
VA VA = {ai}
q
i=1
, where each ai is the priority of xi ∈ S
VB VB = {bi}
q
i=1
, where each bi is the priority of yi ∈ S
ξ∗ the expected value of the random variable ξ
vector VA = (a1, a2, . . . , aq) and VB = (b1, b2, . . . , bq),
respectively. The most widely applied similarity function
is cosine similarity:
cos(θ) =
VA · VB
‖VA‖ · ‖VB‖ , (3)
where θ is the angle between VA and VB . It is often used
to measure the angular similarity between two vectors.
However, cosine similarity is orthogonal to the priorities
on a common attribute. That is cosine similarity can
be high when the priorities on the common attribute
are quite different or exactly the same. This implies
its defect. We do not accept the high similarity if the
priorities differs far from each other. Thus, it is not the
best choice in our scenario.
Different from cosine similarity, Jaccard similarity co-
efficient better fits our scenario, which considers the
quotient of the size of the intersection over the size of
the union of X and Y . To simplify the computation we
employ its variant form, Tanimoto similarity coefficient
[22]:
T (A, B) =
VA · VB
‖VA‖2 + ‖VB‖2 − VA · VB , (4)
where VA and VB are the same as in (3). The inner
product appears in the numerator and the denominator
of (4) displays the difference between VA and VB , and
the norm term adjusts the size of the unit. After these
refinement, Tanimoto similarity coefficient can embody
the difference between two priority set on common
attributes.
4.1.2 P-match
Based on the commutative encryption function [17] and
Tanimoto similarity coefficient, we design our basic
privacy-aware private matching scheme, P-match, which
considers both the number of common attributes and the
corresponding priorities on them. As an initialization,
users encrypt their attributes and priorities under their
secret keys. Fig. 2 shows the details and the procedure
is as follows:
(i) When two users are within the communication
range of each other, the initiator Alice begins
the matching process by broadcasting a message
〈hp(xi)KA , akAi 〉;
(ii) as one of the responders, Bob replies Alice with
hp(yi)
KB ;
5Alice (Initiator) Bob (Responder)
{〈xi, ai〉,KA, kA, xi ∈ X} {〈yi, bi〉,KB , kB , t, yi ∈ Y }
hp(yi)
KB
〈hp(xi)KA , a
kA
i
〉computes 〈hp(xi)
KA , a
kA
i 〉
creates list L1 = 〈(hp(yi)KB )KA , yi〉
computes 〈hp(yi)
KB , b
kB
i 〉
〈hp(yi)KB , (hp(yi)KB )KA 〉
computes F1 = 〈(hp(xi)KA )KB 〉
compares L1 with F1
if (hp(yi)
KB )KA = (hp(xi)
KA )KB , yi ∈ S = X ∩ Y
else creates list L2 = 〈(hp(si)KA )KB , si, bi〉, ∀si ∈ S
creates list L3 = 〈(hp(xi)KA )KB , a
kB
i
〉
compares (hp(xi)
KA )KB with (hp(si)
KA )KB in L2
if (hp(xi)
KA )KB ∈ L2,decrypts ai; else discards
creates list L4 = 〈(hp(si)KA )KB , ai, bi〉
computes the Tanimoto Coefficient T (VA, VB)
if T (VA, VB) < t, terminates;
T (VA, VB)
computes (hp(yi)
KB )KA
if S = ∅, terminates;
for q = |S|, builds VA = (a1, · · · , aq), VB = (b1, · · · , bq)
ranks and terminates
uses k′A to decrypt a
kB
i
〈hp(xi)KA , (a
kA
i
)kB 〉
〈hp(xi)KA , a
kB
i
〉
else, replies Alice with T (VA, VB)
computes 〈(a
KA
i
)KB 〉
Fig. 2: Basic Private Matching Scheme
(iii) based the received message, Alice computes
(hp(yi)
KB )KA and sends the two-tuple
〈hp(yi)KB , (hp(yi)KB )KA〉 together to Bob;
(iv) Bob finds matches and creates a list L1 =
〈(hp(yi)KB )KA , yi〉, and computes a set F1 =
〈(hp(xi)KA)KB 〉. Then, he compares the first el-
ement in L1 with F1 to compute the common
attributes with Alice, the common ones form as
set S, i.e., S = X ∩ Y . Bob creates another list
L2 = 〈(hp(si)KA)KB , si, bi〉, ∀si ∈ S unless S = ∅,
and sends back the 〈hp(xi)KA , (akAi )kB 〉;
(v) Alice computes her k′A by Extended Euclidean algo-
rithm and decrypts the second part of the received
message, then sends out the results 〈hp(xi)KA , akBi 〉;
(vi) upon the receivedmessages, Bob creates another list
L3 = 〈(hp(xi)KA)KB , akBi 〉, then compares the first
element in L3 with (hp(si)
KA)KB in L2. He obtains
the corresponding ai by comparing if the received
akBi = b
kB
i when he can find (hp(xi)
KA)KB ∈
L2, otherwise, discards them. When he gets these
information, another list is created as L4 =
〈(hp(si)KA)KB , ai, bi〉. Then for q = |S|, Bob uses
priorities on each common attribute of Alice and
himself to build two vectors VA = (a1, a2, · · · , aq)
and VB = (b1, b2, · · · , bq), respectively. To measure
the similarity, he computes the Tanimoto Coeffi-
cient T (VA, VB) =
VA·VB
||VA||2+||VB||2−VA·VB
, and com-
pares with the threshold t which is predefined
by Bob. If T (VA, VB) < t, the process terminates,
otherwise, Bob replies Alice with T (VA, VB).
As the initiatormay receive several replies from others,
a ranking of Tanimoto Coefficient is provided for the
initiator to choose the best match.
By utilizing P-match, we achieve Privacy Level I. Bob
can learn the common attributes with Alice, as well as
the corresponding priorities, while Alice learns nothing
except the similarity value. However, there may be a
problem when the scenario changes, i.e., Alice wants to
know some knowledge since Bobmay cheat on her. Thus,
we propose an enhanced version P-match+.
4.2 Enhanced Version
4.2.1 Constructing the enhanced similarity function
When we only consider the common attributes and their
priorities, Tanimoto similarity coefficient is energetic, but
not effective enough if all the attributes and priorities are
taken into account, because it is impossible to invent an
efficient way to put Alice’s and Bob’s all attributes in the
same order if X 6= Y . Hence we need another function,
Ochiai similarity coefficient [23]
O(A, B) =
|A ∩ B|√|A| · |B| . (5)
This coefficient was firstly applied in biology and is
useful in comparing the faunistic feature between two
different localities. It is also a ratio, where the numerator
is the size of the intersection of two sets A, B, and the
denominator is the geometric average between the size
of A and B. However, since all the priorities, on common
and uncommon attributes, are considered here, and we
6sets, we need some more effective similarity function.
For that purpose, we notice that our priority is a kind
of weight function. For a finite set Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zλ}
where every zi has the weight w(zi), i = 1, 2, . . . , λ, let
the weight function be w : Z → I, then the un-weighted
sum on Z is defined by
∑λ
i=1 zi while the weighted
sum on Z is defined by
∑λ
i=1 ziw(zi). If we let Z = X ,
I = {1, . . . , 9} and f(xi) = ai, then the weighted model
becomes our scenario. This implies that we can regard
the priority as a counting rule of an attribute, which is,
we count an attribute xi ai times.
Therefore, we construct a new priority-aware coef-
ficient P (A, B) based on Ochiai similarity coefficient
and the weighted sample. For two attribute sets X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn1} and Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yn2}, the corre-
sponding priority vectors are A = (a1, a2, · · · , an1) and
B = (b1, b2, · · · , bn2), let S = X ∩ Y = {s1, . . . , sq}. First
we generate two counting sets:
X
′ = {x1, x1 + 1, . . . , x1 + a1, (6)
x2, x2 + 1, . . . , x2 + a2, . . .
xn1 , xn1 + 1, . . . , xn1 + an1},
Y
′ = {y1, y1 + 1, . . . , y1 + b1, (7)
y2, y2 + 1, . . . , y2 + b2, . . .
yn2 , yn2 + 1, . . . , yn2 + bn2}.
Then
|X ′| =
n1∑
i=1
ai, |Y ′| =
n2∑
i=1
bi. (8)
Next we find the intersection of X ′ and Y ′,
X
′ ∩ Y ′ = {s1, s1 + 1, . . . , s1 + c1, (9)
s2, s2 + 1, . . . , s2 + c2, . . .
sq, sq + 1, . . . , sq + cq},
where every ci = min{ai, bi} for i = 1, . . . , q. Then
|X ′ ∩ Y ′| =
q∑
i=1
ci =
q∑
i=1
min{ai, bi}. (10)
Provided (8) and (10), now we apply the Ochiai similar-
ity coefficient to the two counting sets X ′ and Y ′ given
by (6) and (7), and define it to be our new similarity
function:
P (A, B) = O(X ′, Y ′)
=
|X ′ ∩ Y ′|√|X ′| · |Y ′|
=
q∑
i=1
min{ai, bi}√∑n1
i=1 ai ·
√∑n2
i=1 bi
. (11)
The range of the priority-aware similarity coefficient (11)
is from 0 to 1, which are corresponding to the cases ”no
common attribute at all” for 0 and ”same attributes, same
priorities” for 1.
Algorithm 1: Part of Enhanced Version on Responder
Side
Input : when receives 〈hp(xi)KA , akBi 〉 from Alice
Output: n, P (A,B) to Alice
1 computes (hp(xi)
KA)KB ;
2 sends 〈hp(xi)KA , (hp(xi)KA)KB 〉 to Alice;
3 computes k′B to decrypt ai;
4 creates L3 = 〈(hp(xi)KA)KB , ai〉;
5 compares (hp(xi)
KA)KB in L3 with (hp(si)
KA)KB in
L2;
6 for those (hp(xi)
KA)KB in L2, computes
ci = min{ai, bi};
7 P (A,B) =
∑q
i=1
ci√∑|X|
i=1
ai·
√∑|Y |
i=1
bi
, where q = |S|;
8 if (P (A,B) < t) then
9 terminates;
10 else
11 replies Alice with P (A,B)
12 end
4.2.2 P-match+
To achieve Privacy Level II, we change some procedures
from step vi in our basic version.
Algorithm 1 shows the changes on responder side in
our P-match+. When Bob receives 〈hp(xi)KA , akBi 〉 from
Alice, he computes (hp(xi)
KA)KB and sends them back
to Alice together with hp(xi)
KA . He can also decrypt
ai by computing k
′
B . Then he creates a list L3 =
〈(hp(xi)KA)KB , ai〉 and compares the first element in L3
with (hp(si)
KA)KB in L2. Followed, he computes ci =
min{ai, bi} for those (hp(xi)KA)KB in L2, the priority-
aware Ochiai Coefficient can be computed as P (A,B) =∑q
i=1
ci√∑|X|
i=1
ai·
√∑|Y |
i=1
bi
, where q = |S|. If P (A,B) < t, the
algorithm terminates, otherwise, Bob replies P (A,B) to
Alice.
Algorithm 2: Part of Enhanced Version on Initiator
Side
Input : when receives 〈hp(xi)KA , (hp(xi)KA)KB 〉
from Bob
Output: The number of common attributes with Bob
1 creates 〈xi, (hp(xi)KA)KB 〉;
2 compares (hp(xi)
KA)KB with (hp(yi)
KB )KA ;
3 if ((hp(xi)
KA)KB = (hp(yi)
KB )KA) then
4 si = xi and S = S ∪ {si};
5 else
6 terminates;
7 end
8 outputs |S|;
While on the initiator side, Alice needs to do some
computation work to obtain the number of the common
attributes, the details are shown in Algorithm 2. Based
on the received message 〈hp(xi)KA , (hp(xi)KA)KB 〉 from
7Bob, the algorithm creates a list of 〈xi, (hp(xi)KA)KB 〉,
and obtains the set of common attributes by comparing
(hp(xi)
KA)KB in this list with (hp(yi)
KB )KA , which is
received before. It terminates if there is no match found
by computing (hp(xi)
KA)KB = (hp(yi)
KB )KA , otherwise,
outputs |S| to Alice.
4.3 Efficient Version
For both P-match and P-match+, they can achieve their
designed goals at the cost of system performance. Since
the heavy cryptographic operations, such as the keyed
hash functions and exponentiation operations, are hard
to perform in current mobile devices, the performance
drops dramatically when the number of attributes goes
large. We thus design a more efficient version, E-match,
which employs a Bloom filter [?] instead of the heavy
exponentiation operations in an honest-but-curious envi-
ronment. A Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic
data structure which is used to test whether an element
is a member of a set.
4.3.1 Initialization
Suppose that the public database is R = {ri}ni=1 consist-
ing of attributes of all users. We let {hi(·)}li=1 be a family
of hash functions with hj(ri) ∈ [1, λ] for an attribute
ri ∈ R, and H be a large public pool of hash functions
of such hi with each indexed by a unique identifier. An
empty λ-bit Bloom filter is an array of λ bits, all setting
to 0 bits. To add an element ri to the λ-bit Bloom filter,
we set all the bits in hj(ri) positions 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ l. To
check whether an ri is some user’s attribute, we verify
whether all the bits in positions hj(ri) are 1. If not, ri is
not this user’s attribute; otherwise, ri is his/her attribute
with a probability determined by n, λ and l.
We label each ri ∈ R by the 2-tuple {j, ri(j)}κj=1, where
ri(j) = ri+ j− 1 is the counting function of ri. Then the
database R is extended to the set {i, {j, ri(j)}κj=1}ni=1.
Moreover, this extended set can be identified with the
indexed set R′ = {{i, j, ri(j)}κj=1}ni=1. If Alice has an
attribute setX = {xi}n1i=1 with the priority set {ai}n1i=1, we
can assign her a personal set SA = {{i, j, xi(j)}aij=1}n1i=1,
where xi = ri′ for an attribute ri′ ∈ R, and ai ∈
{1, 2, · · · , κ} is the priority of xi. The same technique
can be applied to Bob, we get SB = {{i, j, yi(j)}bij=1}n2i=1,
where yi is in Bob’s attribute set Y , |Y | = n2, bi is the
priority of yi. Denote q1 := |SA|, q2 := |SB|, then we have
q1 = Σ
n1
i=1ai = |X ′|, q2 = Σn2i=1bi = |Y ′| with X ′ given by
Equation 6, and Y ′ given by Equation 7.
We pair every l a random number l′, 1 < l′ < l, and
publish the 2-tuple (l, l′) to all users. Now we can use
a λ-bit Bloom filter to check how many attributes are in
Alice’ set X with her priorities, and how many are in
Bob’s set Y with his priorities, so that one of them can
learn the similarity level.
4.3.2 E-match
We then present our proposed E-match shown in Fig. 3
in details.
(i) Alice sends a request to Bob.
(ii) Bob agrees.
(iii) Alice randomly chooses {hi}li=1 ⊂ H with indexes
denoted by HA. Alice adds each {i, j, xi(j)} in SA
into a λ-bit Bloom filter array, denoted by BFA,
with l′ different random hash functions in HA and
(l − l′) random hash functions out of H (Compu-
tation offline above). Alice sends HA and BFA to
Bob.
(iv) Bob counts the number of 0-bits in BFA, denoted
by d1, then he adds every {i, j, yi(j)} in SB to BFA
using HA to get a λ-bit Bloom filter array, denoted
by BFB . He counts the number of 0 bits BFB , say,
d0, and computes
P
∗(A,B) =
√
l[q2 − λ(ln d1 − ln d0)]
l′
√
λq2(lnλ− ln d1)
, (12)
Bob compares P ∗(A,B) with his pre-defined
threshold t, so that he decides whether to match
Alice or not.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove that our proposed schemes can
achieve the required privacy level in turns.
5.1 Analysis of the Basic Scheme
Theorem 1. P-match ensures Privacy Level I if the commu-
tative encryption function is secure.
Proof. For Alice. Bob encrypts the hash value of his
attributes using his secret keys KB and kB , then sends
the messages (hp(yi)
KB and 〈hp(xi)KA , (akAi )kB 〉) to Alice
side. As mentioned in Section 3.4, the commutative
encryption function is secure, so it is computationally
impossible to Alice to obtain any of the attributes or the
corresponding priorities of Bob. When the protocol ends,
what Alice is able to get is a similarity value, which,
in general, indicates a rough similarity. However, it is
impossible to deduce any personal information, such as
the number of common attributes or the corresponding
priorities, from the similarity value.
For Bob. As a responder, Bob learns more informa-
tion than Alice. It is reasonable because a responder has
the weaker motivation to start an attack. In P-match,
even if this kind of attacks happens, the commutative
encryption function and cryptographic hash function
can guarantee that what Bob gets are only the common
attributes and the corresponding priorities of Alice, since
all encryption function are injective, i.e. (hp(xi)
KA)KB =
(hp(yi)
KB )KA if and only if xi = yi, it holds the sim-
ilar conclusion for the corresponding priorities. So, Bob
knows nothing about Alice except the common attributes
and priorities so that he can compute the similarity value
on his own side.
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{〈xi, ai〉, xi ∈ X} {〈yj , bj〉, t, yj ∈ Y }
generates polynomial f(x) =
∏m
i=1
(x− h(xi))(x− h(x
ai+1
i ))
rebuilds f(x) by means of 〈c0, c1, · · · , c2m〉
computes f(h(yj)), h(y
w
j
), where 1 < w ≤ r
for ∀yj ∈ Y
for every sj ∈ S
if f(h(yw
j
)) 6= 0 ∩ f(h(yw+1
j
)) = 0, records 〈sj , w + 1〉;
computes the Priority-aware Ochiai Coefficient P (A,B)
if P (A,B) < t, terminates;
P (A,B)
computes f(x) =
∑
2m
k=0
ckx
k
ranks and terminates
〈c0, c1, · · · , c2m〉
else, replies P (A,B) to Alice
if f(h(yj)) = 0, then yj ∈ S; else discards
else discards
Fig. 3: Efficient Private Matching Scheme
5.2 Analysis of the Enhanced Version
Theorem 2. P-match+ ensures Privacy Level II if the com-
mutative encryption function is secure.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, the com-
mutative encryption function and keyed hash function
provide end users with a secure channel, it means that
only the one who has the secret key can decrypt the
message if he has at least one common attribute with
the other user. Here, the following two possible threats
are our focal points in this match, 1) Alice may illegally
input her attributes as well as the priorities; 2) Bob tries
to learn extra information from the received messages
from Alice by adjusting his threshold.
For case 1), the more Alice inputs attributes xi with the
higher priorities ai, the more personal information of Bob
she gets easily and possibly. We note that for the priority-
aware Ochiai coefficient, the denominator of (11) has the
factor
√∑|X|
i=1 ai, which goes large quickly if either |X |
or any |ai| becomes large. Meanwhile, the numerator∑q
i=1 min{ai, bi} and the other term
√∑|Y |
i=1 bi in the
denominator are preserved for the same responder Bob.
Hence, if Alice is a malicious user, the priority-aware
Ochiai coefficient between her and any other responder
Bob decreases dramatically so that Bob terminates the
protocol according to his pre-defined threshold, and
Alice’s attack fails.
For case 2), to get more extra information from Alice,
Bob does not want to terminate the protocol, so he
must lower his threshold t to proceed Algorithm 1. But
in P-match+ Alice does not send Bob anything except
hp(xi)
KA , akAi and a
kB
i in the beginning phase. Since the
encryption function fk(x) = x
k is pre-image resistant, so
Alice’ information which is known to Bob is not change
at all, whether Bob adjusts his threshold. That means Bob
cannot get more information from Alice by lowering the
threshold t.
Considering the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain the
security for the enhanced version P-match+.
5.3 Analysis of the Priorities
Agrawal et al. [17] proved that, it computes impossible
to map xki to xi without knowing the secret key k under
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman hypothesis (DDH). Specif-
ically, for fixed values of i and j, 〈xi, fk(xi), yj, fk(yj)〉 is
indistinguishable from 〈xi, fk(xi), yj , z〉, where fk(x) =
xk mod p. That means, Bob cannot map xki back to xi if
he does not know the value of k, which is Alice’s secret
key and only known to Alice. Based on these conclusions,
each user’s attributes are safe. Now we consider the
security on the priorities. For the two similarity func-
tions T (A,B) and P (A,B), note that Alice knows the
common attributes and Bob’s corresponding priorities if
T (A,B) = 1 and |X | = |X ∩ Y | in the basic version, and
if P (A,B) = 1 in the enhanced version. Otherwise, when
the two conditions do not hold, we have the following
results.
Theorem 3. In P-match, if Alice has only one attribute,
she can confirm a common attribute and the corresponding
priority of Bob iff. there is only one common attribute between
them. Otherwise, Alice knows nothing if she has more than
one attribute.
Proof. When Alice and Bob have only one common
attribute with priorities a and b, respectively, based
on P-match, she can easily compute b from T (A,B) =
a·b
a2+b2−a·b , where a and T (A,B) are known to Alice.
The other direction is trivial. Now we assume Alice has
more than one attribute. Since in P-match we only take
the common attributes and their priorities into account,
9and we have proved that P-match ensures Privacy Level
I if the commutative encryption function is secure in
Theorem 1, which means Alice knows nothing if the
encryption function is secure. We note that the attributes
and corresponding priorities are encrypted by two dif-
ferent secret keys, and the security of the attribute part
was proved by Agrawal et al. in [17], then Alice knows
nothing.
Theorem 4. In P-match+, Alice can confirm a common
attribute as well as the corresponding priority of Bob iff. she
has only one attribute which is also the only one common
attribute. Otherwise, Alice would know at most one common
attribute and its corresponding priority of Bob.
Proof. The proof for the first part is similar to Theorem 3.
Since in this enhanced version, Privacy Level II can be
ensured if the commutative encryption function is se-
cure, which means, Alice knows the common attributes.
If Alice has at least two attributes and they have the
common attributes of number q ≥ 2, from the expression
of P (A,B), Alice only knows the ratio
∑q
i=1
min{ai,bi}√∑
m
i=1
bi
.
However, this ratio means nothing if Alice does not know
the right priority of every common attribute.
As stated above, we see that there is other potential
attack that a malicious user inputs only one attribute
with the corresponding priority to learn other’s secret
information. However, there are many practical ways to
figure out this problem, such as setting a rule to limit
the minimum number of input. Thus, it is omitted here.
5.4 Analysis of the E-match
The security of the E-match is based on the probability
of false positives for the λ-bit Bloom filter. The accuracy
of the E-match is given by the following two results.
Theorem 5. Via our protocol, Bob can know the expected
values of counts q1 = |SA| and q′ := |SA ∩ SB|, by
q
∗
1 =
λ(lnλ− ln d1)
l
, (13)
and
q
′∗ =
lq2 + λ(ln d0 − ln d1)
l′
, (14)
where d1 is the number of 0-bits in BFA, d0 is the number
of 0-bits in BFB .
Proof. According to [?], the distribution for 0-bits in a λ-
Bloom filter can be regarded as a binomial distribution.
When the length λ is large enough, it approximates
a normal distribution asymptotically. We now suppose
that λ is large enough. For a fixed bit in BFA, the
probability that it is set to 0 by adding one element xi(j)
with l hash functions is (1− 1
λ
)l, the probability that it is
set to 0 by adding all elements xi(j)with l hash functions
is
(1− 1
λ
)lq1 ≈ e−
lq1
λ .
Thus we have e−
lq1
λ = d1
λ
. Solving this equation leads to
q∗1 given by the equation(13).
For a fixed bit in BFA, the probability that it is set to
0 by adding q′ common element with l′ hash functions
is (1 − 1
λ
)l
′q′ , the probability that it is set to 0 not by
adding q′ common element with l′ hash functions is
(1 − 1
λ
)lq1−l
′q′ . Thus for a bit in BFB , the conditional
probability that it is set to 0 is
(1 − 1
λ
)lq2+lq1−l
′q′
≈ e−
lq1+lq2−l
′q′
λ .
Then we have
e−
lq1+lq2−l
′q′
λ =
d0
λ
.
Solving this equation, and combining with the Equation
(13) lead to q′∗ in the Equation (14). If we note that the
Equation (11) of Ochiai coefficient implies that
P (A,B) =
q′√
q1q2
,
The Equation (12) is obtained from the Equation (13) and
Equation (14).
Theorem 6. In the E-match, let q2 = |SA|, then, with the
same notations shown in Theorem 5, we have
q
∗
1 ∼ N [q1, λ
l2
(e
lq1
λ − 1)], (15)
and
q
′∗ ∼ N [q′, λ
(l′)2
(e
lq1
λ + eζ − 2− ζ)] (16)
with ζ = lq1+lq2−l
′q′
λ
.
Proof. From [?] we know that when λ is large enough,
d1 ∼ N [µ1(q1), σ21(q1)] (17)
where
µ1(q1) = λ(1− 1
λ
)lq1 ≈ λe− lq1λ ,
σ
2
1(q1) = λ(1− 1
λ
)lq1 [1− (1− 1
λ
)lq1 ] ≈ λe−
lq1
λ (1− e−
lq1
λ ).
To apply the special version of the central limit theorem
stated in the Theorem 6 in [?], we let λ → ∞, lq1 →
∞ while lq1
λ
is fixed. Regard q1 as a variable, and note
that µ1(q1) is monotonically decreasing, then µ1 has an
inverse function, denoted by g1. Based on the Theorem
6 in [?] and the Equation (17), we know that
g1(d1) ∼ N [g1(µ1(q1)), δ21(q1)], (18)
where δ21(q1) = σ
2
1(q1)(g
′
1(µ1(q1)))
2. Since g1(d1) = q
∗
1 ,
and
g
′
1(µ1(q1)) =
1
µ′(q1)
= −le− lq1 , (19)
we thus obtain the result in Equation (15).
To prove (16), we let
q
′∗
0 =
lq1 + lq2 − λ(lnλ− ln d0)
l′
. (20)
Then the same technique as used in [?] results in
q
′∗
0 ∼ N [q′, λ(e
ζ − 1− ζ)
(l′)2
]. (21)
10
Since the distributions of q∗1 and q
′∗
0 are both normal
distributions, the distribution of the 2-tuple (q∗1 , q
′∗
0 ) is a
multivariable normal distribution. Note that q′∗ = q′∗0 +
l
l′
q∗1 − ll′ q1, thus from the Equations (15), and (21) we
have the Equation (16).
The estimation of the E-match is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 7. In E-match, let q∗1 and q
′∗ be defined by the
Equations (13) and (14), respectively. Then for ǫ1, ǫ2 such
that
ǫ1q1 ≥
(
λ(e
lq1
λ − 1)
) 1
2
l
and
ǫ2q
′ ≥
(
λ(e
lq1
λ + eζ − 2− ζ)
) 1
2
l′
,
we have
Pr(|q∗1 − q1| ≤ ǫ1q1) ≥ 1− p1, P r(|q
′∗ − q′| ≤ ǫ2q
′) ≥ 1− p2, (22)
where
p1 ≥ λ(e
lq1
λ − 1)
ǫ21q
2
1 l
2
, p2 ≥ λ(e
lq1
λ + eζ − 2− ζ)
ǫ22(q
′l′)2
.
Proof. Combining the Equations (15), (16) with Cheby-
shev’s inequality leads to the result in Equation (22).
We qualify the priority-aware attribute by the Shannon
entropy, which is a common measurement of uncertainty.
In the E-match, only Alice sends her information to other
users, so that we only examine Alice’s set SA, where
SA ⊆ R′. On Bob’s side, he only knows κn before the
protocol, and he will know λ, l and l′ after the protocol.
He will compute the expected value of |SA| but will not
know any explicit attribute in SA. Considering the size
of R′ and SA, there are
(κn)!
q1! (κn−q1)!
choices of SA ⊆ R′.
Among those choices, although some sets are counted
repeatedly, Bob does not know which sets are the same
since he cannot know any of the priority ai. That means,
the (κn)!
q1! (κn−q1)!
candidate sets are all equally unknown
in Bob’s eyes. We replace q1 by q
∗
1 . Thus the uncertain
attribute of Alice to Bob can be estimated in bits by
E
∗ = log2
(κn)!
q1! (κn− q1)! .
Moreover we have the following result for the entropy.
Theorem 8. In the E-match, suppose that BFA is the
Bloom filter constructed by Alice using l′ hash functions
in HA based on her priority-aware personal set SA. Then
after sending BFA and HA to Bob, her remaining privacy
information of SA against Bob is
E = q1E[i, j], (23)
where
E[i, j] =
κn∑
x=1
(
κn
x
)
P
x(1− P )(κn−x) log2 x,
P =
l∑
i=1
(
l
i
)
p
i(1− p)l−i,
p = 1− e− lq1λ .
TABLE 2: Experiment setting
Cancer Music Football Tennis Cooking
Alice 8 4 1 3 2
Bob 7 - 2 - -
Charles 1 9 4 2 1
David 9 8 - 6 -
Emmy - 2 9 1 1
Frank 8 3 - - -
Proof. We refer to Theorem 2 in [?] for the privacy-
preserving spatiotemporal matching. The result in Equa-
tion (23) can be obtained if we consider each possible
location cell (cID) to be each possible interest ri[j], and
note that the size of the whole interest pool R′ is κn.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we first design an experiment to verify
the correctness of our proposed protocols. Then we ana-
lyze the system complexity and show our experimental
results.
6.1 Experiment of Correctness
To verify our work, we design a simple experiment by
letting the initiator Alice do the matching with several
candidates (5 users in our experiment) in vicinity. For
simplicity, we assign 5 attributes for each user, they
can set the priorities on each individual from 1 to 9
randomly. As a result, each user may have dozens of
combinations on these attributes. We choose a snapshot
of these priorities, which is shown in Table 2. The
notation ”-” means having no interest at all. Then we
compute the matching results of several existing work.
The best match of Alice in FindU [8] is Charles,
cause they have 5 common attributes. Algorithm in [9]
considers the difference of priorities on each common
attributes, as a result, it is hard to choose the best
candidate from Bob and David, since the differences on
these attributes are: Alice to Bob, [1, 4, 1, 3, 2]; and Alice
to David, [1, 4, 1, 3, 2]. While in P-match, the similarities
with the nearby users are 0.9667, 0.3972, 0.8243, 0.2316,
and 0.9870, respectively. Definitely, we prefer Frank as
the best match. Because either Alice or Frank is more
interested in Movie and Music in their common at-
tributes, even though they have only these two common
attributes. We also compute the similarity values of
P-match+, the results are 0.1122, 0.0905, 0.1138, 0.0547
and 0.1314, respectively. The best match is still Frank.
Similarly, the matching result in E-match can also be com-
puted by the priority-aware Ochiai similarity coefficient
with a probability determined by λ and l, l′, then the
matching results are same with P-match+. For instance,
if we let λ = 400, l = 12, l′ = 11, E-match chooses Frank
as the best candidate for Alice, and computes the exact
similarity coefficients with the probability of 0.85.
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Remark. The range of Bob and David in the experiment
above is different in P-match and P-match+. This is be-
cause we consider the intersection of every two users’
attributes as the sample in P-match and the union in
P-match+. That means, Tanimoto similarity ignores the
number of the common attributes and it only computes
the similarity of the priorities on the same attributes.
Meanwhile, Ochiai similarity computes the number of
the common attributes and the priorities simultaneously
in the union attributes set. In the experiment above, Bob
and Alice have 2 common attributes while David and
Alice have 3 common attributes, but the differences on
common attributes are the same. So Bob is before David
in P-match and after David in P-match+.
6.2 Complexity Analysis
To discuss the complexity of our schemes, we analyze
the online/offline computation overhead and the com-
munication cost from both the initiator and responder
sides. The computation cost is measured by counting
the keyed hash functions and exponentiation operations,
since these operations are always resource-consuming
in mobile devices. h represents a keyed hash function,
such as SHA-256 or SHA-512, while mul1, exp1and
exp2 means 1024-bit multiplication, 1024-bit and 2048-bit
exponentiation operations, respectively. The communica-
tion cost is evaluated by computing the transmitted and
received bits. We compare our work with algorithms in
[20] and [24], since the former algorithm considers the
malicious behavior in private matching as our work, and
[24] tries to offload the computation overhead in existing
secure two-party computation, which is well used in
secure private matching problem. We assume that there
are several mobile users in vicinity, and each user holds
m attributes, where every attribute has a priority value
from [1, κ]. Table 3 shows the theoretic analysis in details.
Our schemes have lower computation cost, especially the
online parts.
6.3 Experiment Setup
To study the feasibility of our algorithms, we first
evaluate the time taken for generating SHA-256, SHA-
512, exp1, exp2,1024-bit and 2048-bit safe primes, respec-
tively. We then implement our proposed algorithms on a
Thinkpad laptop (the cryptography library is Crypto++)
with 1.82 GHz CPU, 4 GB RAM, and Windows 7 32-
bit Professional to simulate the performance, which is
used for the offline computation. We also implement our
schemes on two SAMSUNGNexus S smartphones with 1
GHz Cortex-A8 processor, 512MB RAM, Android v2.3.6,
and Bluetooth v2.1. Each result in our experiments is an
average of 1000 runs.
6.4 Experiment Results
Table 4 and 5 show the mean, maximum, minimum,
medium and standard deviation of time consumption
TABLE 4: Time consumption of different operations on
laptop
Operation Mean Max Min Median Std
SHA-256 (µs) 2.13 2.5 2.1 2.1 0.048
SHA-512 (µs) 10.6 14 10.5 10.6 0.21
exp1 (µs) 340.6 483 338 339 7.13
exp2 (µs) 756.8 986 752 755 12.69
Prime-1024 (ms) 156.37 178 134 156 12.60
Prime-2048 (ms) 1545.27 1663 1413 1546 74.26
TABLE 5: Time consumption of different operations on
Nexus S (ms)
Operation Mean Max Min Median Std
SHA-256 18.79 20 18 19 0.83
SHA-512 22.17 24 21 22 1.10
exp1 39.17 75 20 39 9.05
exp2 59.94 110 35 58 15.31
Prime-1024 582.28 650 525 582 37.52
Prime-2048 7090.46 7175 6518 6892 219.36
of SHA-256, exp1, exp2 and generating safe primes with
1024-bit and 2048-bit, respectively. We can clearly see
the better performance provided by the laptop since
the powerful computing capability. For example, when
we generate a 1024-bit safe prime, averagely, it needs
to consume 156.37 ms on the laptop and 582.28 ms on
the Nexus S, respectively. Fortunately, it needs not to be
worried in our work since we can put these work in the
offline computation phase.
We then show some evaluation results on the of-
fline/online computation cost, communication cost and
the execution time, respectively. Specifically, the offline
communication cost means the operations which can be
pre-computed without supply from other entities. The
online computation cost represents the operations that
to be computed in real time. The communication cost
indicates the transmitted data in bits and the execution
time stands for the total time consumption to perform
a private matching procedure between users, including
both the online computation cost and the data transmit-
ting time between users.
6.4.1 The impact of m
Fig. 4 shows the evaluation results (κ = 10) of the impact
of varying m. We first test the offline computation cost
when the number of attribute m is changing from 20
to 200. Fig. 4a indicates that both of P-match and E-
match have better performance than existing work [20],
[24]. The computation cost in [20] is high since there
are too many exp1s employed in their schemes. E-match
outperforms than P-match by the reason of the utilization
of poly−s instead of the exp1s. The offline cost can be
computed before the regular computations, so this part
does not impact the execution time.
Fig. 4b compares the online computation cost of all
the protocols in the log 10 scale for varying m. It makes
12
TABLE 3: Comparison of Matching Algorithms
Protocols Party Offline Comp. Online Comp. Comm.trans (in bits)
[20] Initiator (2m + 2m2)exp1, (2m)h (m+m2)exp1, (m)h 3m · 1024
Responder (m +m2)exp1, (2m)h (2m)exp1 4m · 1024
[24] Initiator (2rm)exp1, (rm)exp2 (rm)exp1, (2rm)exp2 rm · 2048
Responder —- (2rm + 1)exp1, (2rm+ 1)exp2 rm · 2048
P-match Initiator (2m + 1)exp1, (m)h (2m)exp1 4m · 1024
Responder (2m + 1)exp1, (m)h (3m)exp1 2m · 1024
E-match Initiator (2m)h, 1poly+ —- 1024
Responder (rm)h, ((r − 1)m)mul1 (rm)poly− 32
sense that this part is sensitive to the execution time, so
we aim to offload the online computation to offline as
much as possible. We can clearly see the efficiency of
our protocols over others. For users in P-match, they just
need to perform 2m exp1s on the initiator side and 3m
exp1s on the responder side. While in E-match, it decreases
the computation cost significantly by validating the poly-
nomial with several potential solutions. The online cost
of the protocols in [20], [24] are much higher since they
utilize several exp1s and exp2s in their processes.
Fig. 4c shows the communication cost between en-
tities. Not surprisingly, the result of each protocol in-
creases smoothly with the increasing m. Our E-match
shows a better performance on the communication cost
through replacing the complicated exchanging phases
between entities with a single polynomial. The initiator
only needs to transmit some simple parameters of a
specific polynomial to exchange both the attributes and
the corresponding priorities. For example, E-match needs
to consume 50.28Kb on bandwidth when m = 100. This
is easy for Bluetooth v2.1, since the transmission rate
can achieve approximately 900Kb/s in our experiments,
which means that we only need to spend 55.87 millisec-
onds to finish all the transmissions.
Fig. 4d provides the total execution time of all the al-
gorithms. The execution time in our experiments mainly
includes the online computation time and the informa-
tion transmission time. Comparing with the schemes
in existing work [20], [24], our P-match, P-match+ and
E-match degrade the execution time. When we look
into our protocols more specifically, to get the com-
mon attributes securely, an initiator needs more time
to complete the computation in P-match and P-match+.
However, it is obvious that all of our proposed protocols
can be finished within about 600ms in all simulated
sceneries. For example, when the number of attributes
m = 200, protocols in [24] and [20] need 20.52 and 20.66
seconds to complete the matching phase for each user,
while our P-match and P-match+ require 0.33 and 0.42
seconds, respectively. This value in our E-match is 197.86
milliseconds, which is more practical for mobile users.
6.4.2 The impact of κ
In Fig. 5, we show some evaluation results (m = 100) of
the impact of the varying κ. Fig. 5a indicates the changes
on the offline computation cost with the varying κ. The
evaluation results show that our P-match and E-match
outperform other schemes in all the tested κs. [20] and
P-match are steady in terms of various κ. Meanwhile, [24]
and E-match are impacted by the changing κ. The reason
is that, [24] needs extra exp2s to transform ℓ1 distance
into ℓ2 distance by performing Johnson-Lindenstrauss
embedding, andE-match need to re-build the polynomial
f(x) by computing each possible priority value on the
responder side.
Fig. 5b shows the offline computation cost of the
schemes. The performance of [24] is the worst one when
κ ≥ 8, due to a number of utilizations on the exp2s while
less on the exp1s. E-match outperforms than all other
schemes since it did not employ the heavy operations
such as exp1s and exp2s.
Fig. 5c demonstrates the general trends of the commu-
nication cost of different schemes. We can see [20] and
P-match are stable with increasing κ. For example, when
m = 100, the communication cost are 0.68 Mb in [20]
and 0.59 Mb in P-match. However, in [24], it is heavily
impacted by the increasing κ, the communication cost
exceeds 3.91 Mb when κ = 10. This situation is changed
a lot in our proposed E-match, it is not stable with the
increasing κ, nevertheless, it does not change too much,
for example, the communication cost is about 50.28 Kb
when κ = 10, which is very comfortable for Bluetooth
v2.1.
In Fig. 5d, the evaluation results clearly show the
advantages of our proposed schemes. For instance, when
κ = 10, compared with 5.40 seconds in [20] and 9.54
seconds in [24], our P-match and P-match+ need 161.54
and 217.81 milliseconds, respectively. And in our E-
match, the execution time is only 29.01 milliseconds to
achieve the same goal.
6.4.3 Implementation Results on SAMSUNG Nexus S
Smartphones
To validate the usability of our proposed protocols, we
implement them on SAMSUNG Nexus S smartphones to
test the performance. Fig. 6 shows some selected results
on smartphones, which may be a litter different from the
simulation results on laptop, the reason can be found in
Table 4 and 5. Generally speaking, the main differences
between them are the online computation cost and the
execution time.
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Fig. 4: Impact of the number of attributes m on (a): offline computation cost; (b): online computation cost; (c):
communication cost; (d): the execution time, κ = 10
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
100
101
102
103
104
105
r
O
ffl
in
e 
Co
m
pu
ta
tio
n 
Co
st
/m
s
 
 
P−match
E−match
[20]
[25]
(a)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
10−1
100
101
102
103
104
r
O
nl
in
e 
Co
m
pu
ta
tio
n 
Co
st
/m
s
 
 
P−match
E−match
[20]
[25]
(b)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
104
105
106
107
r
Co
m
m
un
ica
tio
n 
Co
st
/b
it
 
 
P−match
E−match
[20]
[25]
(c)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
100
101
102
103
104
105
r
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
Ti
m
e/
m
s
 
 
P−match
P−match+
E−match
[20]
[25]
(d)
Fig. 5: Impact of the upper bound of priorities κ on (a): offline computation cost; (b): online computation cost; (c):
communication cost; (d): the execution time, m = 100
Fig. 6a shows the online computation cost on the
Nexus S with the varying m. The performance of [20]
and [24] are quite similar with each other, however, they
need several tens of seconds or more to do the online
commination, which cannot be accepted by mobile users.
Our proposed P-match and E-match perform better than
others. Specifically, E-match is the best since it only needs
to verify the polynomial by several possible results,
which is quite simple for modern smartphones.
In Fig. 6b, we show the changes on the execution time
of different schemes. Generally, the execution time is
heavily related with the online computation time, and
it increases with the increasing m. Not surprisingly, the
performance of our E-match is much better than others.
Next, Fig. 6c indicates the online computation cost
on the Nexus S with the changing κ when m is set
to 100. Similar with the evaluation results of online
computation cost on the laptop, the performance of [20]
and [24] are unacceptable for mobile users since they
need several minutes to finish the matching phase. Our
P-match cannot be affected by the changing κ, however,
it still needs 15.67 seconds to do the matching. While in
our E-match, it is lightweight and only consumes 103.6
millisecond to complete the same phase when κ = 10.
In Fig. 6d, the changes on the varying κ bring less
effect on the execution time for the smartphones in
different schemes. Our E-match outperforms than others
significantly. For instance, when κ = 10, the execution
time of [20] and [24] are 584.46 and 757.60 seconds,
respectively. The results of our P-match and P-match+
are 17.41 and 23.47 seconds, respectively. While in our
E-match, it only needs 186.48 millisecond to process the
matching with others, which is absolutely efficient.
6.5 Energy Consumption
We also compute and compare the energy consumption
of our scheme with others. The most energy consumed
operations for modern smartphones are local compu-
tation, display and network transmission [25]. In our
work, since we did not use heavy graphics, we pay
much attention on two main factors, local computation
cost and network transmission cost. We use the energy
consumption model [26] Ecomputing = Pcomp · Tcomp +
0.3167Trun to estimate local computation cost, where
Pcomp represents the CPUs power consumption, Tcomp
means the time spent for computation and Trun indicates
the total protocol run time. For a smartphone with 1
GHz CPU, we choose Pcomp ≈ 0.38w [25]. The energy
consumption model of the network transmission cost is
based on [27]: Enetwork = nt ·Et + nr ·Er, where nt and
nr are the transmitted and received data in bytes, and
Et ≈ 4.8µJ is transmitting energy per byte, Er ≈ 6.7µJ
is the receiving energy per byte. For simplicity, we omit
the initial connection establishment energy since it is
common in all schemes. Then our energy consumption
model can be denoted as:
E = Ecomputing + Enetwork
= PcompTcomp + 0.3167Trun + ntEt + nrEr. (24)
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Fig. 6: Impact of number of attributes m on (a): online computation cost; (b): the execution time, κ = 10, impact of
the priorities κ on (c): online computation cost; (d): the execution time, m = 100
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Fig. 7: Energy consumption
Fig. 7a shows the comparison of energy consumption
on each side of the protocols. It is clear that our protocols
consume less power than other schemes. For example,
when the number of attributes m = 100 and κ = 10,
the initiators in the protocols [20], [24] need to consume
280.18J and 178.00J , respectively. While in our P-match,
it consumes lower energy of 9.81J to achieve the same
goal. Finally, in our efficient version E-match, it degrades
the energy consumption from both the computation and
network transmission aspects, as a result, it consumes
55.60mJ and 33.00mJ on the initiator and the responder
sides, respectively. We can conclude that our protocols
are very practical in terms of energy consumption.
Fig. 7b indicates the impact of κ on the energy con-
sumption, the number of attributes is fixed to 100. Since
the similar result with Fig. 7a, we only point out that the
energy consumption of our E-match is increasing slowly
with the varying κ.
7 CONCLUSION
We propose a Priority-aware Private Matching problem
to satisfy the requirements of our real social life for the
first time. Comparing to existing work, the matching
processes of our P-matchs consider both the number of
common attributes and the corresponding priorities. To
avoid possible attacks from both initiator and responder,
we then construct a priority-aware Ochiai similarity
function in our enhanced version. Finally, an efficient
version called E-match is also proposed to decrease the
cost. The followed security analysis and performance
evaluation show the correctness and efficiency of our
algorithms. Our future work is to deploy our P-match
and E-match into a large scale of real mobile environment
to test the performance.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The preliminary work is accepted by IEEE MASS 2013
[28]. This work was supported by National Natural
Science Foundation of China under Grant 61272457.
REFERENCES
[1] E. Noah. (2011, Nov.) Mobile social networking shows promise,
but rich media has higher engagement. [Online]. Available:
http://www.emarketer.com/Articles
[2] N. Eagle and A. Pentland, “Social serendipity: mobilizing social
software,” Pervasive Computing, IEEE, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 28 – 34,
jan.-march 2005.
[3] L. P. Cox, A. Dalton, and V. Marupadi, “Smokescreen: flexible
privacy controls for presence-sharing,” in Proc. of ACM MobiSys
2007, pp. 233–245.
[4] J. Manweiler, R. Scudellari, and L. P. Cox, “Smile: encounter-based
trust for mobile social services,” in Proc. of ACM CCS 2009, pp.
246–255.
[5] A.-K. Pietila¨inen, E. Oliver, J. LeBrun, G. Varghese, and C. Diot,
“Mobiclique: middleware for mobile social networking,” in ACM
workshop on Online social networks 2009, pp. 49–54.
[6] W. Dong, V. Dave, L. Qiu, and Y. Zhang, “Secure friend discovery
in mobile social networks,” in Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM 2011, pp.
1647 –1655.
[7] R. Lu, X. Lin, X. Liang, and X. Shen, “A secure handshake scheme
with symptoms-matching for mhealthcare social network,”Mobile
Networks and Applications, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 683–694, Dec. 2011.
[8] M. Li, N. Cao, S. Yu, and W. Lou, “Findu: Privacy-preserving
personal profile matching in mobile social networks,” in Proc. of
IEEE INFOCOM 2011, pp. 2435 –2443.
[9] R. Zhang, Y. Zhang, J. Sun, and G. Yan, “Fine-grained private
matching for proximity-based mobile social networking,” in Proc.
of IEEE INFOCOM 2012, pp. 1969 –1977.
[10] M. J. Freedman, K. Nissim, and B. Pinkas, “Efficient Private
Matching and Set Intersection,” in Proc. of LNCS EUROCRYPT
2004, pp. 1–19.
[11] L. Kissner and D. Song, “Privacy-preserving set operations,” in
Proc. of CRYPTO 2005, pp. 241–257.
[12] Y. Sang and H. Shen, “Efficient and secure protocols for privacy-
preserving set operations,” ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 13,
no. 1, pp. 9:1–9:35, Nov. 2009.
[13] G. Ateniese, E. De Cristofaro, and G. Tsudik, “(if) size matters:
size-hiding private set intersection,” in Proc. of ACM PKC 2011.
15
[14] Z. Yang, B. Zhang, J. Dai, A. Champion, D. Xuan, and D. Li, “E-
smalltalker: A distributed mobile system for social networking in
physical proximity,” in Proc. of IEEE ICDCS 2010, pp. 468 –477.
[15] X. Liang, X. Li, K. Zhang, R. Lu, X. Lin, and X. Shen, “Fully
anonymous profile matching in mobile social networks,” Selected
Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, to appear.
[16] J. Manweiler, R. Scudellari, Z. Cancio, and L. P. Cox, “We saw
each other on the subway: secure, anonymous proximity-based
missed connections,” in Proc. of ACM HotMobile, 2009.
[17] R. Agrawal, A. Evfimievski, and R. Srikant, “Information sharing
across private databases,” in Proc. of ACM SIGMOD 2003, pp. 86–
97.
[18] J. Vaidya and C. Clifton, “Secure set intersection cardinality with
application to association rule mining,” J. Comput. Secur., vol. 13,
no. 4, pp. 593–622, Jul. 2005.
[19] M. von Arb, M. Bader, M. Kuhn, and R. Wattenhofer, “Veneta:
Serverless friend-of-friend detection in mobile social networking,”
in Proc. of IEEE WIMOB,.
[20] E. D. Cristofaro, J. Kim, and G. Tsudik, “Linear-complexity private
set intersection protocols secure in malicious model,” in Proc. of
LNCS ASIACRYPT 2010, pp. 213–231.
[21] A. C. Yao, “Protocols for secure computations,” in Proc. of IEEE
SFCS 1982.
[22] A. Ochiai, “Zoogeographical studies on the soleoid fishes found
japan and its neighboring regions. ii,” Bull. Jap. Soc. sci. Fish.,
vol. 22, no. 9, pp. 526–530, 1957.
[23] L. Alan.H., “A proof of the triangle inequality for the tanimoto
distance,” J. Math. Chem., vol. 26, pp. 263–265, 1999.
[24] S. Rane, W. Sun, and A. Vetro, “Privacy-preserving approximation
of l1 distance for multimedia applications,” in Proc. of IEEE ICME
2010, pp. 492 –497.
[25] R. Mittal, A. Kansal, and R. Chandra, “Empowering developers
to estimate app energy consumption,” in Proc. of ACM Mobicom
2012, pp. 317–328.
[26] A. Carroll and G. Heiser, “An analysis of power consumption in
a smartphone,” in Proc. of ACM USENIXATC 2010, pp. 21–21.
[27] A. Rahmati and L. Zhong, “Context-for-wireless: context-sensitive
energy-efficient wireless data transfer,” in Proc. of ACM MobiSys
2007, pp. 165–178.
[28] B. Niu, X. Zhu, T. Zhang, H. Chi, and H. Li, “P-match: Priority-
aware friend discovery for proximity-based mobile social net-
works,” in Proc. of IEEE MASS 2013.
